DM Deshpande
Indigo, a dominant player in Indian civil aviation was compelled to cancel several flights in a week that triggered an unprecedented crisis in their operations. On a single day numbers of flights cancelled were more than a thousand even as the top brass of the company came together in a firefighting mode.
As usual, it was the customers who were at the receiving end. Stories of their sufferings, losses and worse have been doing rounds in the media. The flight rates went over the roof in the first week of December with the Delhi-Bengaluru flight was quoting at a minimum of Rs 40,000, while some other options were placed at Rs 80,000 per ticket!
As the crisis deepened, the civil aviation ministry and the Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), the regulator, intervened and held in abeyance some of the stringent rules that had come into effect from November 1 2025.
Indigo has been a market leader in the industry for quite some time. With Jet Airways and Go First no longer in business, Indigo consolidated its position and acquired two-third market share in a rapidly growing Indian civil aviation sector. The airline operates about 1,500 flights daily in the domestic sector; going by reports in the media due to the winter demand pile up, it was now flying 2,300 flights.
Indigo commands a huge 65% market share in Indian civil aviation. It is a near duopoly with Indigo and Air India under Tata Group controlling 91% of market share. Air India, now under Tata-Singapore airlines combine, is still under a long and tedious turn around process with complex legacy and merger issues. In a way, therefore, the runaway for Indigo was clear.
The civil aviation industry is growing at a brisk pace in India, which is not surprising given the fast GDP growth and huge potential for the transport sector due to the vastness of the nation. Indigo not only redefined scale but is also known for punctuality. Then, what went wrong, suddenly?
A company that had built a 400 plus aircraft operation with a market cap of Rs 2.3 lakh crore found itself in a situation of massive collapse in its operations. Actually both internal and regulatory (external) factors are to blame for the fiasco. Clearly, it is not a ‘sudden’ shock; it was in fact, waiting to happen. Changes in the regulatory norms were notified quite early by the DGCA, more than a year ago.
The revisions were made to Flight Duty Time Limitations (FDTL) to combat pilot fatigue and align such safety measures with the global standards. In fact, these revisions were long overdue in Indian civil aviation. Essentially under the new norms, weekly rest time for pilots was increased from 36 to 48 hours; maximum weekly landings a pilot could make from mid night to morning was capped to two instead of six; the maximum time a pilot could fly a plane that stretched into night time was restricted to 10 hours and no more than two consecutive night duties in a week for a pilot.
Night duty is now defined correctly to 00.00 to 06.00 instead of the earlier 00.00 to 05.00. All this meant a drastic reduction in the number of flights pilots could operate per week. Clearly the ‘lean staffing’ ‘buffer deficit’ model, thin roster reserves and heavy reliance on night flights and optimum utilization of aircrafts-all strategies Indigo had grown accustomed to use backfired.
The gross misjudgment of pilot requirements led to the collapse of operations. To be fair, DGCA gave enough time and the rules were to come into effect in a phased manner with complete enforcement from November 1.
Airlines had to increase their pilot head count and conduct training programs as laid down within the buffer time. While the other airlines seem to have complied with the new norms, Indigo has clearly defaulted. It somehow managed the show in November with lesser numbers of flight cancellations and buying leave time of pilots.
There are reports that suggest that the biggest Indian airline was under the illusion that it was too big to fail. The sheer arrogance and the overconfidence that it can fix everything at the DGCA and ministry level was its undoing. Inside Indigo the feeling that the exemption to the rules would come was so strong that it continued to add aircrafts without hiring more pilots till November 1.
The rule relaxation did come but not in the normal way, away from the glare of stakeholders. It came with a strict warning and a small window to adhere to the norms quickly. It exposed the risks of capitalism without adequate regulation. Add to that the level of corruption prevailing, customers are left high and dry. While this would attract huge penalties and stringent action elsewhere, no such thing happens in India. Even the customers feel it is their ‘karma’!
The DGCA too is at fault. The regulator must keep his eyes and ears open. It is not enough to notify rules; it is equally important to ensure their timely compliance. It is not right to allow the crisis to develop and then to ‘relax’ rules in public interest.
The Indigo incident is not just a symptom but a pointer to larger issues plaguing the industry. It is a virtual duopoly with Indigo controlling nearly 65% of the market share. Indian civil aviation is big and growing. It can attract potential investors to enter the field but the ease of doing business needs a re-look.
Transparency and friendly norms are particularly important in the industry that is impacted by cyclical fluctuations. High risk, high tech and exacting service standards define the industry. Players and regulators need to pull up their socks.
The author has four decades of experience in higher education teaching and research. He is the former first vice-chancellor of ISBM University, Chhattisgarh
