NANDKUMAR M. KAMAT
India recently became the world’s fourth-largest economy, but it lags behind the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It needs to critically examine what the PRC is doing to generate knowledge and wealth to catch up. In the New Year, I will focus on this vast country.
From an Indian perspective, China’s scientific trajectory in 2026 demands serious attention, not admiration. What is unfolding is not simply the growth of a neighbouring country’s research capacity but the consolidation of a tightly controlled, state-directed science system that increasingly converts knowledge into power.
For India, this raises concerns regarding strategic balance, technological dependence, regional stability, and the future direction of global science. China’s stated objective of becoming a global science and technology superpower by 2035 is already influencing outcomes well before this deadline. By 2026, many programmes launched in the last decade will mature into
operational systems.
This will not necessarily mean better science in the intellectual sense, but more science deployed at scale, faster, and with fewer internal restraints. India must evaluate China’s progress not by counting publications or launches but by understanding how scientific capacity is being weaponised economically, technologically, and geopolitically.
In fundamental and applied sciences, the most concerning trend is China’s shift from experimentation to infrastructure development. Quantum technologies illustrate this shift. China is expected to establish a limited yet functional quantum communication network by 2026, integrating terrestrial fibre systems with satellite links. This will not be an open scientific platform but a controlled national asset serving the state, military, and financial priorities. India, still in the early stages of its National Quantum Mission, risks falling behind, not in ideas but in execution. The danger is not symbolic inferiority but vulnerability, as secure communication becomes a strategic differentiator.
Quantum computing follows a similar pattern. China may not achieve universal fault-tolerant machines by 2026, but it is likely to demonstrate targeted quantum advantages in areas of national relevance. These will be promoted aggressively as evidence of technological leadership, regardless of the narrowness or fragility of the results. For India, the concern is that such demonstrations will shape global narratives and standards, influencing funding flows, collaborations, and talent mobility in ways that marginalise slower and more deliberative
research cultures.
Materials science is another area in which China’s approach is unsettling. Heavy investment in superconductivity, power electronics, and semiconductor materials is driven by the clear intent to bypass external constraints. Even incremental advances are rapidly absorbed into the industrial pipelines.
In China, AI is being constructed as a sovereign, regulated system designed to serve governance, surveillance, manufacturing, and defence. By 2026, domestically developed AI models will be deeply embedded across state functions and operate under strict ideological and regulatory controls. This is not innovation in the liberal sense; it is the automation of power. India’s more open and decentralised AI ecosystem preserves democratic values but also leaves critical gaps in infrastructure, computing access, and public-sector deployment. The risk is that India will become a consumer of platforms and standards developed elsewhere, including those shaped
by China.
Semiconductors are an even greater concern. China’s response to export controls has been to push relentlessly toward self-sufficiency, even at a high cost and with reduced efficiency. By 2026, domestic production of mature but strategically adequate chip nodes is expected to support key sectors, including telecommunications and defense electronics. Although India’s semiconductor initiatives are ambitious, they remain vulnerable to delays, policy uncertainty, and external dependence. Energy and green technologies highlight this imbalance. China dominates the global battery and electric vehicle supply chains. Further advances in sodium-ion and early solid-state batteries by 2026 are expected to deepen this trend. For India, which has aggressive renewable energy targets but limited manufacturing depth, this creates a structural dependency that is rarely openly acknowledged.
Simultaneously, China’s sustained investment in nuclear fusion research, despite uncertain timelines, shows a willingness to absorb long-term costs for strategic positioning. India’s fusion and advanced energy research remains vulnerable to shifting priorities and budgetary constraints. In biotechnology and medicine, China’s emphasis on scale and data integration raises serious ethical and strategic concerns. Large genomic databases linked to artificial intelligence will increasingly shape diagnostics and drug development. By 2026, China is likely to achieve breakthroughs in population-specific medicine by leveraging massive data aggregation. India, with far greater genetic diversity, has not matched this scale, largely due to governance, privacy, and trust issues. While these concerns are legitimate, they have resulted in a widening capability gap. China’s earlier controversies in gene editing did not slow progress; they merely resulted in tighter state control. Clinical results from carefully selected trials are likely to be available by 2026, strengthening China’s claims of biomedical leadership while normalising opaque oversight practices.
Space science is perhaps the most visible domain of China’s advances and is the most strategically consequential for India. Lunar missions focused on the moon’s south pole will continue with the explicit aim of establishing a long-term presence and utilising resources. China’s expanding satellite constellations and progress toward reusable launch systems will further consolidate its position in orbit. By 2026, China will increasingly influence the governance, access, and commercialisation of space.
Oceanography and polar research require closer scrutiny. China’s deep-sea exploration capabilities, plans for permanent underwater research stations, and expanding polar operations are presented as scientific endeavours, but they also extend their strategic reach. India, with vital interests in the Indian Ocean and polar regions, has underinvested in ocean science relative to its geopolitical interests. By 2026, China’s data advantage in marine systems is expected to translate into leverage for resource exploration, environmental negotiations, and maritime security.
Asymmetries are emerging in the field of climate and meteorological science. China’s advanced satellite networks will deliver high-resolution data on extreme weather, emissions, and land-atmosphere interactions in the future. These capabilities directly support domestic disaster management and agricultural planning. India, one of the most climate-vulnerable countries in the world, continues to struggle with gaps in observation density, data assimilation, and modeling. More troubling is China’s willingness to pursue large-scale weather-modification programmes. By 2026, such interventions may be operational, raising unresolved ethical and regional concerns, particularly in shared atmospheric and hydrological systems that affect the South Asian region. China prioritises technological self-reliance over efficiency or openness. Military and civilian research are closely integrated, ensuring the rapid translation of scientific work into strategic capability. Scientific cooperation with the Global South is framed less as a partnership and more as influence-building, using technology transfer and infrastructure to shape dependencies. For India, which seeks leadership among developing nations, this creates a crowded and increasingly competitive space. Scientific capability directly impacts economic resilience, national security, and diplomatic leverage.
India must strengthen its research institutions, reduce fragmentation between science and deployment, protect scientific autonomy while improving execution, and commit to long-term investments insulated from political volatility.
China’s scientific rise in 2026 should be interpreted as a warning signal. It demonstrates what disciplined, centrally directed science can accomplish quickly, but also what is lost when knowledge becomes an instrument of control, rather than a means of inquiry. India’s challenge is to respond with seriousness, not slogans, and to ensure that its scientific future is shaped by deliberate choice rather than reactive adjustment. We wish our readers a happy New Year.
