Crisis underscores a complex shift in the nature of threats within critical infra by individuals who undergo radicalisation while embedded within operational roles
The harrowing incident aboard Flydubai Flight FZ1073 has shattered the fragile illusion of modern aviation safety, reminding the world that the most lethal threat to a commercial aircraft might not be a bomb smuggled in luggage, but the very person trusted at the controls. On September 30, 2026, an ordinary flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv transformed into a theatre of sheer terror when the radicalised co-pilot, unleashed a brutal assault using the cockpit’s emergency crash axe against the aircraft’s captain, Smit Machchhar.
As the Boeing 737 MAX 8 went into a terrifying 17,000-foot nosedive, it was only the extraordinary resilience of a bleeding, severely wounded Captain Machchhar who managed to unlock the cockpit door and the raw courage of off-duty pilots and passengers that prevented an unfathomable catastrophe.
Intelligence agencies later confirmed the chilling truth: the co-pilot intended to weaponise the airliner, planning a 9/11-inspired suicide mission to crash directly into Israel’s bustling Ben Gurion airport. For anyone who watched the towers fall 25 years ago, the parallel is chilling. In 2001 the hijackers had to force their way onto the flight deck, in 2026 the attacker was already there.
In aviation itself, the deliberate crash of Germanwings Flight 9525 in 2015 showed what a single person in the cockpit can do. Other than aviation, trains, metros, buses and ferries move millions of people every day through open, crowded and connected spaces. A bus or train driver controls a vehicle carrying hundreds of people, often with no second crewmember to step in. A ship’s master or engine-room officer holds the lives of thousands at sea. Even those who never touch a vehicle, such as signalling staff, air traffic controllers, caterers and baggage handlers, have access that a determined insider could abuse. Every one of them is trusted, and every system built on that trust is only as strong as the screening behind it.
This crisis underscores a complex shift in the nature of insider threats within critical infrastructure by individuals who undergo radicalisation while embedded within sensitive operational roles. As organised terror networks have been broken down and driven underground, the threat has fragmented into radicalised lone actors acting on their own. When public transit systems face disruption from within, traditional security paradigms require re-evaluation. The strategy behind such acts relies on exploiting the open, interconnected nature of modern transport networks to maximise disruption and civilian casualties. Addressing these vulnerabilities requires moving beyond reactive measures toward comprehensive, preventative oversight.
Early findings from the Flydubai investigation point to a familiar weakness i.e. background information that does not travel. Aviation is global, but vetting is still largely national and tied to individual employers. A crewmember can be trained in one country, licensed in another and employed in a third, and warning signs picked up by one authority may never reach the next. Static, compliance-based screening that is carried out once at recruitment and rarely revisited is no longer enough. A pilot who passed every check five years ago may be a different person today.
The response has to be layered, running from the flight deck up to the level of international treaties. At the international level, ICAO and national regulators should set up unified, real-time mechanisms for sharing background checks, disciplinary records and security flags, so that no one with a documented risk can move between carriers or jurisdictions unnoticed. Intelligence agencies, aviation authorities and law enforcement need to treat insider threats as a shared priority instead of a matter for each organisation alone.
At the airline level, vetting must become continuous. India’s domestic fleet has crossed 822 aircraft and backed by an order book of over 1,500 aircraft, is set to reach 2,250 aircraft by 2035. We have around 11,800 airline pilots, within a pool of about 25,001 DGCA-licensed pilots, which is projected to rise to 30,000–35,000 pilots by 2030–35.
Measures need to be instituted for periodic re-screening, structured psychological assessments, and lawful, proportionate review of public digital footprints for all the pilots. Just as important, airlines need confidential, non-punitive mental health and peer-support programmes.
Across the wider transport network, airports, railway stations and transit hubs should strengthen security, train staff to recognise and report behavioural warning signs, and rehearse joint emergency responses with police, hospitals and emergency services. The same insider-threat principles should apply to everyone with privileged access, including engineers, ground handlers, train drivers and control-room operators. At the level of the public, alert passengers and crew remain the last line of defence, as FZ1073 showed.
As instability spreads and extremists grow more desperate, the protection of public travel will become a test of national resolve. The professionalism of one wounded captain and the bravery of the people on board saved hundreds of lives. However, safety cannot depend on heroism in a crisis. Governments, regulators and transportation sector must act together to set strict, uncompromising standards for internal screening and intelligence cooperation. The lesson of FZ1073 is that the threat has moved inside. Our defences must move with it, before the next attempt succeeds.
(Brigadier (Retd) Anil John Alfred Pereira is a veteran from Goa, who served the nation with distinction for 32 years.)
