A fresh wave of controversy has emerged ahead of the publication of General (Retd) MM Naravane’s book ‘Four Stars of Destiny’, with commentary suggesting that there may have been a lack of political direction during the face-off with China’s People’s Liberation Army in May 2020. Such claims demand sober reflection. When examined against the ground realities of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the stated political intent and the operational conduct of the armed forces reveal not ambiguity but clarity, preparedness, and calibrated resolve.
In democracy, civil-military frameworks operate on the principle that political leadership sets strategic objectives, while military commanders exercise professional judgement in execution. From the outset of the crisis, the political leadership articulated an unequivocal position ‘not an inch of our territory will be ceded’ a principle that has consistently underpinned the government’s approach to national security. This strategic clarity was extended decisively into the digital domain by banning numerous Chinese mobile applications, scrutiny of technology investments, restricting participation in critical infrastructure, and strengthening cyber and telecom security frameworks.
These measures signalled that national security encompasses both territorial and digital spaces and both remain non-negotiable. Political direction defines objectives, sets red lines, and empowers the defence forces to act within that framework as was witnessed during the conduct of Operation Sindoor. In 2020, the red line was explicit i.e. defend sovereignty, restore status quo ante where violated, and impose costs on unilateral attempts to alter the LAC.
To fully appreciate the developments of 2020, one must first understand the unique character of the LAC which is a perception-based alignment that runs through some of the world’s harshest terrain often above 12,000 feet where extreme cold, rugged topography, and rarefied air make even routine survival a challenge. Across this unforgiving frontier stand two of the world’s largest militaries. India assesses its boundary with China at 4,056 km, with the LAC extending approximately 3,488 km, while China places the length at roughly 2,000 km reflecting deep and persistent differences in perception.
It is this very ambiguity that has, over time, led to Sino Indian War in 1962, clashes in Chola and Nathula in 1967, Tulungla in 1975, Sumdorong Chu in 1987, Depsang in 2013 which were successfully de-escalated through calibrated military and diplomatic engagement. In 2017, the Doklam standoff near the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction was defused after weeks of tense confrontation.
What made 2020 standoff unusual was its scale and timing occurring in the backdrop of the global Covid-19 pandemic. The simultaneous emergence of multiple friction points suggested a coordinated effort to test India’s resolve by exploiting this ambiguity to seek incremental advantage employing grey zone tactics against India which is consistent with China’s strategic playbook be it in South China Sea or in Tibet along the LAC.
However, history does not judge a crisis by how it begins, but by how it ends. In late August 2020, the Army executed Operation Snow Leopard, a bold, pre-emptive strategic countermove that fundamentally altered the dynamics of the Ladakh standoff. On the night of August 29-30, our troops scaled and occupied dominating heights along the Kailash Range looking down over China’s Moldo Garrison and the Spanggur Gap, effectively neutralising Chinese tactical advantages on the North bank of Pangong Tso. This led to an unprecedented eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation, with tanks positioned merely hundreds of metres apart compelling China back to the negotiating table which culminated in the first phase of disengagement in February 2021.
It is important to underscore that the Army does not improvise in moments of crisis; it prepares for them. Its operational doctrine incorporates detailed contingency planning, including calibrated quid pro quo options designed to counter adversary actions with proportionate, precise, and strategically aligned responses. The raising of the Mountain Strike Corps was a structural affirmation of the need for credible offensive capability along the northern borders. Beyond force expansion, the Army has undertaken a comprehensive reorientation of its posture by rationalising deployments, enhancing forward habitat for troops, fortifying logistics chains to sustain prolonged winter deployments, and strengthening rapid mobility and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
This modernisation drive has further evolved with the raising of specialised Rudra brigades and Bhairav battalions equipped with advanced drone and counter-drone systems, loitering munitions, and integrated surveillance platforms. These formations are tailored to the realities of high-altitude warfare, ensuring technological superiority, enhanced situational awareness, and swift neutralisation of emerging threats. Together, these measures signal that any misadventure along the northern borders will be met with preparedness, precision, and decisive resolve.
The India-China boundary question is likely to persist as long as the LAC remains undemarcated and subject to competing perceptions. However, the suggestion that there was a vacuum of political direction in 2020 overlooks a fundamental reality that the national policy was clearly articulated, publicly stated, and strategically consistent. Debates over wording or retrospective interpretation should not detract from the fact that the LAC will continue to be a contested and that India’s political resolve backed by credible military preparedness will ensure that any attempt to unilaterally alter the status quo will invite a firm, calibrated, and proportionate response.
(Brigadier (Retd) Anil John Alfred Pereira is a veteran from Goa, who served the nation with distinction for 32 years.)
