India’s population growth reached a unique landmark when the United Nations estimates in April 2023 proclaimed India had surpassed China as the world’s most populous country. In the 1950s and 1960s, India’s uncontrolled demographic growth caused severe food shortages, unemployment, overcrowding and poverty. More people meant more mouths to feed, forcing governments to push for family planning aggressively. The southern states responded and today, Andhra Pradesh’s fertility rate is 1.5, significantly below the ideal replacement level of 2.1 required to keep the population stable. While Karnataka and Keralam have equally low figures, Tamil Nadu with 1.3 is even lower. So why does only the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh announce financial incentives of Rs 30,000 for the birth of a third child and Rs 40,000 for a fourth to reverse the state’s declining population? What is worrying Andhra Pradesh, to cause its Chief Minister to want more babies?
A healthy economy needs a balanced population pyramid with several working age adults supporting children and the elderly. Today’s youngsters simply do not want children because of housing, education and career pressures. Should not southern states with improved literacy, more educated women, fallen infant mortality, increased urbanisation where families have became smaller, be equally concerned? Why then is only Andhra Pradesh announcing incentives?
In different states, India simultaneously faces opposing demographic problems. In southern India, the concern is about ageing and a shrinking workforce, in Bihar with a fertility rate of 3.0, Uttar Pradesh with 2.7, governments struggle with high fertility, pressure on schools, unemployment, strained resources and the development challenge of a rapid population growth.
Economic development is one cause, agricultural societies, believe that larger families mean more farm labour. Whenever societies become wealthier and more urbanised, fertility usually falls. Urban couples increasingly prioritise quality of life over family size, aspiring for better living standards. Children become economic expenses requiring expensive schooling, healthcare, coaching, housing, not economic assets. In urban middle-class societies, every child is an emotional investment. Women’s education changes the equation further. Educated women marry later, work longer, usually choosing smaller families. Infant mortality changes the equation even further, modern healthcare ensuring more children will survive.
Another key dimension is the number of Lok Sabha seats, allocated based on the basis of population size making political power dependant on population. The government’s new Delimitation Commission to reallocate Lok Sabha and state Assembly seats by redrawing electoral boundaries will reflect current populations. Southern states controlled fertility efficiently, while northern states did not reduce fertility as quickly. Eventually, the north’s share of India’s population has grown faster. Southern states will lose political influence despite being economically stronger and performing better. Reducing fertility responsibly results in losing representation. Andhra Pradesh by encouraging births, is not merely discussing babies, but future economic strength, labour supply and political weight within the Indian Union. Andhra Pradesh faces a paradox created by its own success. Becoming healthier, more educated, more urban and more prosperous, are key reasons for lowered fertility. The continuous decline producing ageing, labour shortages and reduced political influence.
Why doesn’t Karnataka incentivise more babies? Because states respond only when low fertility intersects with politics, labour shortages, ageing and public perception. Despite a low fertility rate Karnataka is coping differently from Andhra Pradesh. By attracting enormous migration from across India, Bengaluru functions like a demographic sponge masking population problems. The city has a continuous flow of young workers from several parts of India flowing into Karnataka’s economy. This migration delays the visible effects of low fertility, with industry finding workers, the urban economy continuing to feel youthful and dynamic. Population growth in Bengaluru remains strong even if Karnataka’s fertility declines, the fewer births being compensated by migration-driven labour supply. Andhra Pradesh, on bifurcation, lost its largest urban economic engine, sharpening concerns of future labour force size and economic competitiveness.
Similar is Keralam’s case, a state living with low fertility since long. Here high literacy, strong healthcare, female education and migration to the Gulf had steadily reduced family size over decades. Apart from gradually adjusting to an ageing society the state has another safety valve; remittances and migration, the economy became less dependent on an expanding local labour supply, along-with an increasing reliance on interstate migrants.
A country of 1.47 billion is not one demographic unit and needs to worry if some of its states have too few births, too many elderly future citizens and too few young workers. States like Andhra Pradesh do need to react to its future population structure through political messaging.
The world’s most populated country has transited to a demographic uneven state with consequences that will shape politics, economics and society for decades ahead.
(Priyan R Naik is a columnist and independent journalist living in
Bengaluru.)
